Although there is clear moral impetus to do justice for victims and to alleviate their plight, reparations are often not implemented by states. Even when they are adopted, the law is limited in its ability to do justice, in that it cannot undo the egregious harm caused by disappearances, torture or sexual violence. Added to this is that victims may number in their millions and post-conflict countries can be ravaged, leaving little resources to provide 1 Principle 15, A/RES/60/147. Hereafter referred to as the UN Basic Principles of Reparation.
where a breach by a state of a primary obligation requires reparation to be made to an injured party. As stated in the seminal Chorzow Factory case reparations should, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed…It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. 6 In times of transition reparations have moved beyond the individual-centricity of private law and the state-centric nature of international law, to acknowledge that individuals have standing to claim reparations from states. Perhaps one of the most successful reparation programmes has been compensation paid by Germany and other countries to victims of the Holocaust and the state of Israel. 7 As discussed below, such success is based on the moral indignation, public attention to the justification of reparations, and available resources that make such large awards possible.
The advent of human rights has cemented the individual's right to reparation to recognise the protection of the individual in international law against excesses of power of the state. 8 There is growing customary practice of individuals' right to reparation against the state and non-state actors in armed conflict and gross violations of human rights. 9 More recently, the international personality of the individual has been expanded to include individual responsibility for reparations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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This international attention to reparations has also seen general and discrete international 6 Regional human rights courts have been at the forefront of developing reparation
jurisprudence. Yet they recognise the limits of the law, in that returning victims who have been killed or torture to the original position as 'impossible, insufficient, and inadequate'.
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Judge Cançado Trindade suggests, 'reparation cannot "efface" [a violation], but it can rather avoid the negative consequences of the wrongful act.' 13 Human rights courts have firmly established the principle of full and effective remedy for gross violations of human rights.
The human rights remedial approach has three components: acknowledgement; responsibility;
and remedy. As such reparations intend to publicly acknowledge the suffering and dignity of This remedial approach can also better protect minorities or discriminated groups, as returning them to their original position before the harm may reinforced inequalities or structural victimisation that gave rise to their suffering. 15 It can be sensitive to gender, indigenous and children's rights, reflecting that the experience of harm to such groups is different, due to discrimination, communal rights, or impact of violence on their development.
While this may cause perception of creating a hierarchy of victims and not treating them all equally, 16 an important and meaningful aspect of reparations is to tailor, as far as possible, appropriate remedies that can alleviate the suffering and causes of victimisation.
For instance, the Inter-American Court in Serrano Cruz Sisters v El Salvador as part of a reparations package established parameters for a national commission to trace children who had disappeared during the armed conflict, ordered the creation of website to support the search, as well as a DNA database and a national day of commemoration for children disappeared during the conflict. 17 
II. The theoretical and practical bounds of reparations in times of transition
Despite the growing international acceptance of reparations, in times of transition it can be unworkable to provide full redress to all victims of mass atrocities. Human rights courts are generally responding to individual cases, redressing only a fraction of the total victimised population in a country who can number in their hundreds of thousands of victims. The effect of this case-by-case approach is two-fold according to de Greiff, whereby it both disaggregates victims and disaggregates reparations. 19 With disaggregating victims, there is generally unequal access to courts, which are more likely to be used by urban elites, and it distinguishes individuals from each other based on their own harm. In disaggregating reparations, case-by-case awards cause discrepancies by individualising reparations, rather than providing comprehensive redress. This section explores reparations in times of transition in terms of its theoretical and practical bounds, by discussing it as a political project, its transformational potential and as part of comprehensively dealing with the past. Responsibility for reparations and their remedial effects can be further diminished by being subsumed within developmental programmes to affected communities, rather than to victims.
A. Reparations as a political project
Accordingly, such programmes can represent more distributive justice, than corrective or remedial justice. These issues are explored further in subsequent sections.
B. Reparations as transformational
Reparations in times of transition can be both backward and forward looking, in the sense that they attempt to redress past violations as well as to prevent future occurrence. 
III. Who is eligible for reparations?
Victim populations in the aftermath of collective violence or armed conflict can number in the hundreds of thousands to even millions. 47 Determining which individuals and groups are eligible for reparations is beset with logistical, moral and political challenges. 48 The UN Basic
Principles on Reparations stipulates that victims are those who have, individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term "victim" also includes the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.
This broad definition of victims and notion of harm as a criterion for eligibility is 'potentially limitless' as during times of conflict or under an authoritarian regime everyone suffers in some way. 49 However, the scarcity of resources for countries emerging from collective violence or conflict means only certain victims will be entitled to reparations.
To make reparation programmes and international declarations more feasible, they generally concentrate on the most harmful violations of individuals and groups' civil and political rights, such as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, torture and sexual violence. while motivated by a desire to address the very real consequences of the violence, proved unworkable. First, the universe of harm it intended to redress was enormous and the victim population particularly difficult to define. By looking at consequences of violations, the increasing size of the population affected was unavoidable. (In fact, in that early plan, they expected to be providing reparations for close to two million people, about 7 percent of the population.) Individual idiosyncrasies of how people were affected by violence increased exponentially as well, making it more and more difficult to adequately respond to the long-term situation of each. ... Causation issues became mixed with other underlying social problems that exacerbated or coincided with harms caused directly by the abuses experienced. By using this approach, without tying the analysis to the original violations in a more specific way, reparations can become repair for exclusion and lack of social attention to broad sectors of the population. Thus, in one fell swoop one can lose the specific recognition of human rights victims as such, and frustrate those who suffer the same problems but are not included in the program. 
A. The scope of the 'transition'
A more general challenge in transitional justice is delimiting its temporal scope, i.e. 'what exactly transitional justice is transiting "from" and "to"'. 59 In terms of eligibility for It is likely that if any form of reparations is agreed it will be symbolic or transformational, rather than compensation, given the distance in time and degree of suffering.
B. Apportionment amongst family members
Related to this is the challenge for the law in determining apportionment of reparation amongst family members. In cases of mass atrocities, the direct victims may have been killed leaving a number of indirect victims as next-of-kin or dependants. Such apportionment of reparations does not have to follow domestic inheritance law. The Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) departed from sharia-based inheritance law to give a larger percentage to widows (40% rather than 12.5%) instead of the eldest son. 64 In Chile the amount of pension for a person disappeared or killed was apportioned amongst family members as 40% surviving spouse; 30% for mother or father in her absence; 15% for the mother, or the father, as the case may be, of the victim's biological children; and 15% for each one of the children of the person. If
there is more than one child, each received 15% even if exceed the total amount. 65 There is an issue of maximising resources for those most seriously harmed. As stated by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in determining the scope of a state's obligation to those it harmed, Every human act produces diverse consequences, some proximate and others remote. An old adage puts it as follows: causa causae est causa causati. Imagine the effect of a stone cast into a lake; it will cause concentric circles to ripple over the water, moving further and further away and becoming ever more imperceptible. Thus it is that all human actions cause remote and distant effects. To compel the perpetrator of an illicit act to erase all the consequences produced by his action is completely impossible, since that action caused effects that multiplied to a degree that cannot be measured.
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Thus logically speaking it is impossible to oblige a perpetrator or responsible party to redress all harm of their actions. 
IV. Who is responsible for reparations?
Reparations have traditionally been connected to deontological notions of remedy, in that an injured party or victim, who has suffered from a wrongful act, violation or crime, has a right to seek redress from the perpetrator, who is obliged to follow the law. Responsibility helps to distinguish reparations as a form of accountability by evincing the corrective justice requirement of the wrongful party remedying the harm they have caused. Responsibility can serve a symbolic function in acknowledging and vindicating the wrongfulness of a victim's suffering by directing blame away from them and towards the actor responsible.
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As with determining eligibility for reparations, responsibility can also frame the narrative of the conflict or violence. This is apparent at the inter-state level in the Of course transitional justice is not just about accountability, but also trying to 
V. The process and mechanisms of reparations
While most of our discussion so far has focused on the substantive and political dimensions of reparations, in this final section it is worth examining the process and mechanisms that have been developed in transitional countries to deliver remedial measures. In legal terms reparations as remedial measures can be conceptualised in procedural and substantive terms. 137 We have discussed the substantive content of reparations, such as compensation.
The procedural aspect of remedy reflects procedural justice concerns, in that those who have 135 Rombouts supra note 41, at 21. 136 See Moffett supra note 74. 137 Shelton supra note 5, at 7. their interests affected, i.e. victims, should have access to and be able to participate in proceedings. By enabling victims to have their views and concerns heard in reparation proceedings it can impact on decision-making, thereby shaping substantive outcomes. 138 This also requires judges and courts to be impartial and sensitive in facilitating victims' input.
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The 2005 UN Basic Principles on Reparations (UNBPG) teases out such concerns by suggesting that states should ensure equal and effective access to justice; access to information; provide assistance and legal advice to facilitate their access and participation;
treat victims fairly; and protect their integrity, privacy and well-being.
A. Reparations as a process
In psychological terms, reparation processes can be important to victims, as it helps to convey the public acknowledgement of their suffering and the symbolism attached to reparations. victims as 'valuable agents of political and social transformation', in particular for those groups previously marginalised, such as women and minorities. 145 Process is not just psychological or procedural, but it also entails a temporal dimension. In the aftermath of collective violence victims may seek to normalise their position in the community by assimilating, rather than wanting to publicly distinguish themselves as victims. 146 It can take time for victims to organise and claim reparations.
Society also needs time to engender shared public acceptance and understanding of the need for reparations to become a political priority. In the US, reparations to those JapaneseAmerican interned during the Second World War, were only provided an apology letter and a cheque for $20,000 in 1988, after over four decades of victims campaigning and litigating. 147 Starzyk and others suggest that it depends on society viewing reparations as feasible, in that it does not compromise valuable social resources. 148 Moreover, Osiel argues that communities or societies are unlikely to sacrifice sacred values and issues of concern, such as recognising complex victims as eligible for reparations, unless the opposing side is willing to do the same. 149 Thus gaining traction on the reparations debate is more than just political or economic wrangling, but a more nuanced social and moral steering that inevitably takes time to be normalised or accepted.
Time can also have the effect of diminishing reparations as a public priority where they are no longer perceived as feasible. For instances in South Africa, reparations were a key part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's mandate, which in the end recommended $2,700 for six years to each victim who testified before the TRC, some 22,000 individuals.
However, the South African government took nearly seven years from the initiation of the TRC until it paid reparations to those victims, even then it reduced the sum to a single $4,900 payment. 151 In the interim victims had been vilified by the government that their pursuit of reparations was for financial gain or greed, than for the economic development of the country. 152 The sad fact is that time works against victims, many of whom will die before seeing an award. The passage of time means that reparations may only benefit the direct victims' descendants or next of kin, lessening it remedial effect and making such measures appear more like distributive justice than corrective redress. It can also take time to mobilise public resource or consolidating public debts to facilitate reparations. In Argentina compensation was first paid out to those illegally detained amounting to some $1.17 billion, then a further $1.9 billion to families of those disappeared, 
B. Reparation mechanisms
Reparations can be ordered, recommended or delivered through a number of mechanisms.
This section discusses the four main types: courts; truth commissions; reparation programmes; and inter-state procedures. In the absence of a reparation programme, victims often turn to the courts for redress, both during violence and in the aftermath. Of course recourse to the courts is very much limited to finding sufficient resources to fund such cases and evidence of victims' harm and the perpetrators' responsibility. In times of collective violence the administration of justice is often unable to operate or unwilling to do so, whether through authoritarian state or threat to security from non-state actors. Court settlements can achieve an outcome for victims, but those responsible can limit or absolve their liability. As with the Mau-Mau claim against the British government, the government apologised and paid out nearly £20 million in compensation, but it denied its liability for violations committed by the colonial administration. Ultimately with mass atrocities recourse to the courts is for the fortunate few, who do not represent or speak for all victims.
Civil litigation can provide an avenue for seeking justice and maintain public awareness of victims' plight. This is apparent in the case brought by some of the families of the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland, where 29 civilians were killed by a bomb planted by the Real IRA, were awarded £1.6million compensation award against four senior members of the organisation, after no one was convicted for the bombing. 171 As noted above, litigation and court-based awards for reparations are individualistic and unworkable for mass atrocities.
Nevertheless, civil litigation plays an important part in instigating, sustaining and reexamining a wider discussion on reparation claims. Collective claims by victim groups can help to develop solidarity amongst members and their technical skills, such as administration, advocacy and fundraising, in a sense self-empowering. 172 Larger administrative reparation schemes do not always run smoothly, and are often subjected to judicial scrutiny, which can improve or clarify the scope of reparations. 173 Truth commissions can be apposite forum for recommending mass reparation programmes, as they collect information on victimisation, the number of victims, impact on groups, and those organisations responsible, making them well placed to make recommendations on appropriate reparations. 174 However, not all truth commissions'
short-term nature of truth commissions means that they lack the mandate to ensure their recommendations on reparations are implemented once their term is complete.
175
Generally in times of transition, reparations are delivered through a separate mechanism, which assesses eligibility and administers awards. In contrast to court-based reparations, these more political negotiated national reparation programmes reflect the collective responsibility of the state, rather than individuals, and aim to deliver redress to large numbers of individuals, making them more comprehensive. there is weak enforcement powers. This is apparent in the DRC v Uganda case, where the ICJ found Ugandan state forces responsible for violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and ordered it to make reparations, which were claimed at $10-15 billion, but this has not been made over a decade later, with renewed proceedings beginning in 2016. 181 As a result there can be a myriad of reparation processes at domestic, regional and international level, with reparations in the DRC reappearing at the ICC and domestic military courts. 182 This indicates a lack of comprehensive redress at the domestic level, forcing victims to seek justice beyond the state.
C. Evidential and financial challenges
Two of the biggest practical challenges in designing and operating a reparation programme are finding sufficient evidence to support claims and financial resources. With the first of these, there can be a number of problems with evidence verification: incomplete evidence;
vast amount of information received; time-period for submissions; different languages; illiteracy amongst claimants; and fraudulent claims. 183 Some of these issues can be resolved by relaxing evidential standards. 184 As noted by the Iraq-Kuwait UN Claims Commission the general situation of emergency and breakdown of civil order, resulted in a scarcity of evidence meaning many victims would be unable to provide sufficient evidence to support their claims. Thus taking a flexible approach the UNCC required claimants to provide 'simply' documentation on the proof of the fact and the date of injury or death. 185 Not all claimants will have the same access to evidence. Women, elderly and disabled can be marginalised from completing applications and reparation processes by their physical immobility, illiteracy, or stigma. 186 Thus there is an acute need for outreach to inform claimants of the reparation scheme, application forms and deadlines. 187 In Timor-Leste the commission kept its application deadline open for two years after closing of its mandate to ensure most victims could access redress. 188 However, extending deadlines and lowering evidential burdens brings the risk of fraudulent claims, such as members of a neo-Nazi group claiming compensation from a Holocaust claims process to deplete funds available for victims. 189 There remains a need to scrutinise applications.
A significant challenge eluded throughout this chapter has been the financing of such reparation programmes. Often states lack the political will to finance reparation programmes.
UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff argues that the state cannot simply ignore the claims of victims with the argument that there are no resources to cover the corresponding costs, or alleging that there is simply no way to overcome the problems described. This would be tantamount to acknowledging that it is in no position to sustain a fair regime. 190 Yet he notes that states often do not initiate reparation programmes as they are 'unaffordable' or compete with resources for reconstruction and economic development. 191 Two of the main ways to fund reparation programmes in many transitional contexts is through funds or a dedicated budget line. 192 De Greiff suggests that dedicated budget lines are more successful than funds, as dedicated budget lines represent clear political commitment to redressing victims' suffering. 193 There are financial alternatives, such as micro-financing schemes for victims, 194 paramilitaries in Colombia 197 ), but these can be unpopular and raise separate implementation issues. Correa suggests that states can prioritise reparations over defence budgets. 198 The modalities of awarding individual reparations can also be creative and staggered over time to avoid large initial lump sum payments, such as pensions, university scholarships, or medical coupons for rehabilitation, as suggested by the Kenyan TJRC. Such measures also need to be complemented with wider provision of collective reparation, such as memorials, and basic social provision such as education, housing and healthcare. Otherwise compensation awards will be quickly exhausted paying for these basic service, rather than allowing the victim to use it to alleviate their daily suffering and provide new opportunities. 199 Such support should be used in conjunction with development programs and NGO assistance so as to ensure communal and societal reconstruction. 200 than right-holders. 202 Accordingly while there are serious evidential and financial challenges with reparation programmes for mass atrocities, creative ways can be fashioned if there is sufficient political will.
VI. Conclusion
Reparations A major challenge to reparations in times of transition is not getting them on the political agenda or recommended by a truth commission, but having them implemented.
Gaining social acceptance as to the need and feasibility of reparations is a delicate balance, which takes time. Victims are often at the forefront in litigating, advocating and negotiating their right to reparations. In terms of sensitising society on the necessity of reparations perhaps snowballing a compensation program for a small group of victims into subsequently larger and more comprehensive process, as in Chile, can normalise the need for reparations.
What is apparent from this survey of reparations in transitional contexts is that there exists a myriad of approaches in redressing mass atrocities. While there are significant practical, financial and political challenges to provide reparations, creative solutions can be engineered to overcome these concerns. If not, victims and their descendants will continue their pursuit of justice through reparations for many years to come.
